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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GORDAN MASAGULUL PALELEI, : Case No. 20000727-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE THE 
REQUISITE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE 
RECORD IN SUPPORT OF ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IS RELIABLE. 
The State contends that the trial court did not err in 
failing to make the requisite factual findings and legal 
conclusions in support of the determination that the eyewitness 
identification evidence was constitutionally reliable and thus 
admissible. See State's Brief ("S.B.") Point I.B. The State 
incorrectly suggests that such findings may be assumed from the 
record.1 S.B. 16-18. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 
1
 The State cites State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991), for the proposition that appellate courts may assume 
factual findings from the record in support of a trial court's 
decision to admit an identification if the evidence reasonably 
supports it. See S.B. at 15 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 
(quotations omitted)). Ramirez noted that findings may be 
assumed in the context of a motion to suppress evidence seized 
pursuant to a stop and seizure. 817 P.2d at 787-88. Ramirez did 
not make a similar assertion in its discussion of the motion to 
suppress the eyewitness identification. See id. 778-84. 
Accordingly, Ramirez cannot be interpreted to mean that factual 
findings in support of admitting eyewitness identification 
evidence can be assumed from the record as the State suggests. 
(Utah 1997), set forth three exceptions to the general rule that 
factual findings may be assumed from the record when they are not 
explicitly made by the trial court: 
[(1)] the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption 
unreasonable, . . . [(2)] a governing statute 
explicitly provides that the trial court must make 
written findings of fact regarding a particular matter, 
. . . [or (3)] this court has previously determined 
that the trial court must make written findings on an 
issue to assure that the materiality of the question is 
impressed on the trial judge so as to enable this court 
to perform properly its appellate review function. 
Id. at 1224-25 (citations omitted). Eyewitness identification 
cases like the present one fit squarely under all three 
exceptions. 
First, "the ambiguity of the facts" that the trial court 
below considered in admitting the identification evidence render 
the assumption of supporting findings unreasonable. Id. at 1224. 
As discussed at length in Paleleifs opening brief ("A.B.") at 
p.15-17, the record of the suppression hearing indicates that the 
trial judge summarily ruled that the identification evidence was 
admissible, stating only that, "I think [Pudil!s] identification 
of the defendant when he walks in the door is sufficient," 
R.141[18], and "if [Davis] does identify [defendant] in court, 
then I think youfve got a right to cross-examine him." 
R.141[24]. There was no discussion of the facts in support of 
that determination and no analysis of the Long reliability 
factors, leaving ambiguity on appeal. A.B. 15-17. In the 
2 
absence of any articulated facts or analysis under Long, findings 
may not be reasonably assumed. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 
940, 944 (holding that findings could not reasonably be assumed 
from record where trial court merely stated that identification 
testimony was admissible because "fit!s an issue of fact as to 
whether or not the eyewitness is reliable1") (quoting suppression 
hearing transcript). 
Second, findings may not be assumed because Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(c) (2000), "a governing statute[,] 
explicitly provides that the trial court must make written 
findings of fact" in support of its decision to admit 
identification evidence. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224-25. Rule 
12(c) provides: 
A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the 
ruling be deferred for later determination. Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) (emphasis added). Rule 12(c) applies to 
motions involving the admissibility of identification evidence 
since the analysis involves a fact-specific inquiry under factors 
set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). See State 
v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) requires trial court to make record 
findings in determining admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence); see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-80 
3 
("[i]n determining admissibility, the trial court will be 
required to resolve certain factual issues. . . . We will require 
an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability along 
the lines laid out by Long") . Accordingly, findings may not be 
assumed since Rule 12(c) requires written findings on the record. 
Finally, findings are required by this Court's opinion in 
Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943-44. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1225 
(findings required if mandated by appellate court). As noted in 
Palelei's opening brief and supra. Nelson holds that Rule 12(c) 
requires findings on the record in support of a trial courtfs 
decision to admit eyewitness identification evidence. A.B. 13-
15. Hence, Nelson establishes the rule that a court must make 
findings on the record regarding identification evidence pursuant 
to Rule 12(c). Findings, therefore, may not be properly assumed 
in the context of a trial court's order to admit identification 
evidence. 
The State misleadingly asserts that Nelson does not "create 
a rule requiring written findings." S.B. 19. The State cites to 
dictum in the Nelson opinion wherein this Court rejected 
appellee's argument that findings consistent with the decision to 
admit identification evidence could be assumed from the record, 
and makes the inference that findings may properly be assumed in 
the present case. Id. (citing Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944). The 
State's argument does not rest on the actual holding of Nelson, 
4 
discussed supra. 
Yet, even if Nelson stood for the proposition that findings 
may be assumed in the eyewitness identification context, they 
could not be inferred in the present case. Like the trial court 
in Nelson, assuming findings would not be appropriate because 
the trial court [below] did not consider any evidence, 
did not discuss the reliability factors, and made no 
explicit determination of reliability. rSee supra & 
A.B. 16-17 (discussing trial court's bare assertion as 
to admissibility of identifications).] To assume the 
facts and perform the reliability analysis on appeal 
would eviscerate the Ramirez holding requiring that 
trial courts, as gatekeepers, make the initial 
determination as to admissibility. 
Id. at 944. 
In light of the foregoing and for the arguments set forth in 
Palelei's opening brief Point I.A., the trial courtfs failure to 
enter written findings of fact merits a new trial. See Nelson, 
950 P.2d at 944-45; Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE 
JURY REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
The State erroneously asserts that the eyewitness 
identification instruction ("instruction") submitted by the trial 
court adequately advised the jury as to the inherent weaknesses 
of such evidence. S.B. Point II. The State contends, in part, 
that the instruction is adequate although it fails to include 
factors that may affect the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification, "such as the distance of the witness from the 
suspect, the length of time available to perceive the event, and 
5 
the amount of movement involved." S.B. 24. Quoting Long, the 
State argues that such factors are "'rather obvious, f" S.B. 24 
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 488), and that the "Long court was 
more concerned with the less obvious considerations affecting the 
capacity to observe." Id. n.8 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89). 
The State cites Long out of context. Long notes that the 
deleterious effects of distance, time, and movement upon an 
eyewitness identification were "rather obvious" to underscore the 
necessity of alerting a jury to their importance. 721 P.2d at 
488. Indeed, the Long opinion goes on to describe such factors 
as "critical" to the reliability of an identification. Id. 
For these reasons, and the arguments set forth in Paleleifs 
opening brief Point II, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the inherent 
weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the arguments set forth 
in his opening brief2, Palelei respectfully requests this Court 
to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial on the basis 
that the trial court erred as a matter of law failing to make the 
requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the 
admissibility of the eyewitness identification evidence. A new 
2
 Palelei submits on his opening brief in response to the 
State's arguments not specifically addressed herein. 
6 
trial is also required where the court erroneously admitted 
identification evidence that is not constitutionally reliable. 
Alternatively, Palelei requests this Court to vacate his 
conviction and remand for a new trial where the trial court 
misinstructed the jury as to the law regarding eyewitness 
identification evidence. 
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